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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD ROSS, 
Plaintiff and 
Apt:Jellant, 
vs. 
CAROL ROSS, 
Defendant, Counter-
claimant, Respondent, 
and A9pellant, 
and 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Intervenor and Appel lee. 
Supreme Court No. 15800 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLEE,STATE OF UTAH 
Apt:Jeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, the Honorable David Dee, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff Richard Ross to modify a 
California divorce decree, with a counterclaim by defendant 
Carol Ross for judgment as to arrearages in child support and 
alimony. The State of Utah, Department of Social Services, joined 
the action with a claim against plaintiff for reimbursement of 
welfare ~aid to the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried by t.he lower court without a jury. 
-2-
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The lower court modified the divorce decree in favor of the 
plaintiff and granted judgment for the defendant on the 
counterclaim in the amount of $24, 4 7 5. 0 0, representing arrearage: 
in alimony and child support. Judgment was also granted fort 
State of Utah, Department of Social Services, in the amount 
of $1,544.00,representing reimbursement of welfare paid to 
the defendant, Carol Ross. Plaintiff appeals that part of the 
lower courts judgment granting the defendant $24,475.00 in 
arrearages and the state $1, 544. 00 in reimbursement. Defendant 
appeals that nart modifying the California divorce decree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellee, Utah State Department of Social Services, seeks 
an affirrnance of the judgment of the lower court against plaint: 
appellant Richard Ross for $1,544.00, representing reimbursement 
welfare the State paid to defendant Carol Ross. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and defendant were divorced in California i'. 
February 1971. The defendant was awarded alimony of $150.00 
per month and child support of $100. 00 per month i;>er child for 
each of three children. 
After the divorce decree the plaintiff left Californiat 
Texas, where he began living under an assumed name (Henderson), 
to avoid making the payments under the divorce decree. (T. lO,li' 
In October 1972, defendant Carol Ross went on welfare in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. (T.68) She executed an assignment to the 
Utah State Department of Social Services. (Ex.4) By virtue of 
the assignment the Department of Social Services, through a 
special investigator, Mr. Theo1ore Zambos, began unsuccessful!! 
-3- zr1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trying to find Mr. Ross to seek reimbursement for the money the 
state was paying to the defendant. (T.106) 
In July _1973, Mr. Ross initiated contact with Utah State 
Recovery Services through a Dallas attorney. (Ex.17) Mr. Ross 
subsequently called Mr. Zarnbos at Recovery Services, and 
a discussion between them took place. Mr. Zail).bos submitted a 
letter to Mr. Ross (Ex.16) in response to the phone conversation. 
(T.30, 161-4) 
Later, in October 1973, Carol Ross went off welfare since 
she began receiving some support from Mr. Ross. (Ex. 15) When 
Mr. Ross began the present action to reduce the amount of support 
and alimony under the California divorce decree, the Utah State 
Department of Social Services intervened with a claim to recover 
$1,854.0Q for welfare payments it made to Carol Ross from October 
1972 to October 1973. 
Other facts are important with respect to the claims between 
the plaintiff and defendant. They are not critical, nor do. they 
affect the States position and are therefore omitted, allowing 
the plaintiff and defendant to cite the matters pertinent between 
them. 
ARGUMENT 
The State of Utah will respond to and argue those matters 
relevan~ to the appeal issues raised by the appellant/plaintiff 
regarding the State's position only. Some matters regarding the 
defendant and State of Utah are common points; thus, those matters 
will likewise be addressed. 
-4-
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POINT I 
THE ASSIGNMENT GIVEN THE STATE BY MRS. ROSS WAS NOT 
OF UNLIMITED SCOPE, BUT WAS ONE RESTRICTIVE IN NATURE, 
IT DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE COMPHOMISE OF "ALI:' CLAIMS. 
On October 25, 1972, Carol Ross, the defendant in this 
action, executed an "Assignment of Collection of Support Payment 
in favor of the State of Utah. (Ex. 4) Pursuant to said assign-
ment, the State of Utah began efforts in attempting to locate 
Mr. Richard Ross as evidenced by Exhibit 25. Sometime in June 
or July 1973, Mr. Ross, through attorney B. Patrick Shaw, 
made contact with the Bureau of Recovery Services as evidenced 
in his attorney's letter to Mr. Ross dated July 24, 1973. (Ex.11) 
Plaintiff would have this court believe that the assignmer 
(Ex. 4) grants broad powers to the State of Utah far beyond the 
actual money figure that the State had invested in Mrs. Ross. '. 
State rejects this contention of plaintiff. Such a positioois 
without support or evidence. The assignment reads in part: 
For public assistance received or to be 
received, i Carol D. Ross hereby and assign, 
transfer and set over to the Utah State Division 
of Family Services, all monies payable to me 
and/or my child from Richard M. Ross during 
the time I am or we are receiving oublic assistance 
andalso oast suooort and alimonv due me, not in 
excess of amount due while receiving public 
assistance ... (Emphasis added) (Ex.4) 
Plaintiff claims this language, "Carte Blanche:' authorize: 
the State to compromise, dismiss, exonerate, forgive, etc. ainou: 
"in excess" of what the State has expended in welfare oayroents. 
The language simply does not support plaintiff's position. 
easy to see how plaintiff is confused since plaintiff failed to 
quote the critical language in his brief. Plaintiff failed to 
include the following: 
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... during the time I am or we are receiving 
public assistance . . . not in excess of amount due 
while receiving public assistance . . . "(Emphasis Added.) 
How the plaintiff can contend that the assignment goes beyond 
the restrictions contained above is beyond the understanding 
of the State. Not only did the State not try to exceed the 
authority above, it didn't exceed the authority of the assignment. 
In the present action, Carol Ross was receiving approximately 
S232.00 per month. Mr. Ross' obligation was $450 ($300 child 
support and $150 alimony). Thus, when the State sued for the 
$1,854.00 covering a several month period, the State of Utah 
in no way exceeded the amount due in total payments or in monthly 
payments. For an eouivalent 8 or 9 month period, the amount due 
under the California decree would be approximately $3,600 to $4,050, 
which is arrived at by multiplying his monthly obligation of $450 
by eight and nine months respectively. 
If, for example, the figures were reversed and Mrs. Ross 
was receiving $450 per month from the State and Mr. Ross' obliga-
tion was $232, the assignment could be interpreted to mean xhat 
the State of Utah is entitled to sue for alimony and/or child 
support payments extending beyond the period when Mrs. Ross was 
on welfare until the State gets judgment or funds equivalent to the 
total amount the State expended in her behalf. Such is not the 
case here,and therefore plaintiff's argument is self-defeating. 
It has not been shown (1) that the State of Utah had the 
authority in this case to seek beyond what it did at trial, (2). 
that any attempt was ever made to seek more, (3) that the assign-
ment itself authorizes what plaintiff contends,and (4) that any-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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thing happened showing any attempt to exercise more authori~ 
than what the assignment allows. 
Since the assignment involves the use and recovery of 
"child support," such an assignment must be read in a restricte 
nature. For the State of Utah t;o attempt to disregard the rigl 
of the custodial oarent and children for support over and abov; 
what the State has given them, when in fact they are entitl~t 
it, is unconscionable. Further, in this matter where the State 
interest ($232) is not even equivalent to the amount the J?laint 
was· to :oay for sup:oort of the children (~ 300), the matter of tr, 
alimony being assigned for use of the State is not consistent. 
is child support that was sought. The defendant Carol Ross wa; 
entitled to her right to the alimony that was not affected by 
the assignment, as well as e}~cess child su:o:oort owing. 
What plaintiff is contending is that the assignment woulc 
allow the State to compromise a claim of an extremely large arno. 
in this case $25, 000, to which the custodial na.rent is entitle: 
to receive a comparably small amount, in this case $1,500. Sue' 
a position is not supported, and certainly is not equitable. 
The assignment does not so provide. 
Plaintiff cites the closing paragraph of the assignment t 
"prove" the State has authority to compromise her claim. This 
paragraph must be read as a whole with the entire document. 
The divorce decree is between plaintiff and defendant. Mrs. Ro' 
is legally entitled to all support. By virtue of the assignmen: 
she allows the State to act for its share in return for the suo: 
given her and her children. · a frc: The State's rights are derive 
her and are not independent ~xceot as assigned." Thus, if t~ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
state had to obtain permission from the custodial ~arent every 
time it wanted to take an action, a burden "too great" would 
be placed on the State. In many instances, when women terminate 
welfare, the State no longer knows where they are. Thus, by 
assignment the State is authorized to act, sue, settle its 
entitlement under the assignment without requiring notice 
to the woman, in this case Mrs. Ross. 
The State of Utah is therefore limited and not given 
unbounded authority in what it can and cannot do. The lower 
court rejected plaintiffs contention because it is an unsub-
stantiated position. As expressed above; this court should 
do the same. 
POINT II 
NOTWITHSTA.~DING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STATE'S 
AUTHORITY UNDER THE ASSIGNMENT, THERE WAS NO AGREE-
MENT EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WHEREBY THE STATE WAIVED 
ITS OWN OR MRS. ROSS' ARREARAGES. 
Plaintiff somehow contends that "all " arrearages, both 
for the State of Utah and the defendan~were waived by the State. 
The record is clear that NO EXPRESSED, DEFINITE, PRECISE, ACKNOW-
LEDGED waiver has been produced in the record. The burden is 
plaintiffs and he has not met that burden. 
The evidence presented by and relied on by plaintiff is 
two-fold: First, Mr. Ross' testimony of a telephone conversation 
which took place between him and Mr. Zarnbos in early October 1973, 
and second, a letter written to Mr. Ross by Mr. Zarnbos, dated 
October 4, 1973,which referred to the prior phone conversation. 
(T.30-1, 161-4, Ex.16) 
-8-
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In reviewing the first position, Mr. Ross claims that 
it was in the phone conversation he had with Mr. ZaI"l.bos that thi 
actual comoromise took place. (T.30-1, 161-4) Mr. Ross claims 
that Mr. Zarnbos told him that if he just paid $225 l?er month, t' 
"everything would be fine." Mr. Zarnbos disputes that this conv, 
sation compromised the arrearages. (T .115-117) Mr. Zambos 
testified that in the several years he had been with the Bureau 
of Recovery Services he had never (1) made an agreement to acce 
less than the court-ordered amount in a divorce action if that 
arnou~t would come to the State, and (2) compromised 
all arrearages for nothing, and he didn't believe he had the au 
to do so. (T .119-21) Therefore, the testimony regarding the oh 
conversation is in dispute and up to the trier of fact to determ 
The State of Utah believes other testimony exists which w 
!"lelp interpret both the letter and phone conversation even if t 
court were to accept plaintiff's arguments at face value. 
The evidence and testimony show that Mrs. Ross was receiv 
$232 in the summer of 1973. Plaintiff!:; own attornev, via a let 
to the plaintiff (Ex. 17), stated: 
As per our telephone conversation, your ex-wife, 
Carol, is receiving $232.00 per month from the Utah 
Bureau of Farnilv & Children's Services. The Bureau·...!....! 
suggest that yo~ send this amount to them each month 
and that they will in turn see that Carol is given 
this amount. . . · (Emphasis Added) . 
Then in Exhibits 18 and 19, Mr. B. Patrick Shaw sent 
letters to Mrs. Ross saying that Mr. Ross would be sending $2~ 
per month to the Office of Recovery Services. It is not incon· 
sistent with the State's postion for Mr. zarnbos, for purposes 01 
-9-
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simIJlification and uniformity, to say (hypothetically): 
"three children at $75 per child is $225 which is close 
to $232, so we'll accept that amount for current support 
as long as she is on." Thus, as long as she is on and Mr. 
Ross pays $225 per month (3 x$75) everything would be fine. 
Is this compromising and dropoingall past amounts? The 
State says no! Nowhere in the record is there evidence to 
substantiate plaintif~s contention. 
The State of Utah, as expressed in Point!, only had the 
right to collect what it had paid out in this case. Therefore, 
at most it could collect $232 per month, and after the phone 
conversation, for simplicity sake, Mr. Ross was allowed to fulfill 
his obligation to the State at the rate of $75 per child for the 
future. The State did not have any right and made no attempt 
to discuss or handle Mrs. Ross' claim, which was the difference 
between the $450 and the $232 assigned to the State. The 
telephone conversation does not show otherwise. 
Now, turning our attention to the letter referred to as 
Exhibit 16, is this letter inconsistent with the position that 
the State is entitled to $232 or aryproximately $75 per child? No, 
it is not. Sure, the State could have said that he is to pay 
$77.33 1/3 per child or the equivalent of $232. This is to allow 
that if one child would turn 18 or die or for some reason the 
welfare grant be reduced with one of the children out of the home, 
then the amount would be $154.66 2/3. It is a cumbersome and unneces-
sarv burden on both the State and the plaintiff to get involved 
in the game of figures. Thus, if all three children are on welfare, 
the payment is $225, if two are on welfare the pavment is $150 and 
-in-
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if only one, the obligation to the State is $75. This is Mt 
inconsistent with what :::xhibit 16 says, or with the understandi· 
of Mr. Ross that all would be fine (for continuing support) or 1 
understanding of plaintiff's attorney as evidenced by Exhibits 
17-19. 
The letter in question, though it speaks for itself, is 
to say the most open for several interpretations. Obviously the 
trial court, being able to see and hear all the evidence, reject< 
plaintiff's claim that the letter was evidence that all arrearac 
were forgiven -- which the letter does not say. The arrearage. 
even mentioned. 
The letter says as follows: 
This will confirm our teleohone conversation 
of October 2, 197~ at which tim~ you agreed to pay 
$75.00 a month child support for each child totaling 
$225.00, effective September 1, 1973; furthermore, 
you agreed to double up on your payments to bring 
your account current by October 31, 1973. (Exhibit 16) 
As indicated, this letter is open to several interpretati1 
from both sides, and possibly more from those not involved in 
this matter. I will try to analyze several of them. It must 
be. remembered, that as of October 4, 1973, Mrs. Ross was still 
receiving welfare and Mr. Ross had made a payment in August of 
$232.00. 
Interpretation #1: This interpretation is consistentwW 
the previous discussion, above, that instead of $77. 33 1/3 oer 
child, Mr. Ross could pay the State of Utah $225 per month to 
meet his obligation beginrringSentem'Jer 1, 1973. Though the reco 
does not reflect whether Mr. Ross made a payment in September, 
if he had not, he could double up his payment for October and 
become current on his ongoing obligation by October 31, 1973· 
- 1 1 - ... 
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(T.30) This is the more logical and sound oosition. Under 
this inter~retation, nothing is mentioned about the past amounts 
due, and nothing is said about Mrs. Ross' rights, •. ,.hich consist 
of the difference between what is due the State and what is due 
under the decree. The letter does not even refer to Mrs. Ross 
at all. 
Interpretation #2: This interpretation is taken by 
plaintiff -- that the letter "modifies" the divorce decree and 
that the State of Utah had the power to do so and bind both the 
State and Mrs. Ross to an ongoing obligation of $225.00 per month 
with the past amounts waived. 
Plaintiff, here, is trying to make an ambiguous letter the 
"written proof" that the divorce is changed, the arrearages are 
waived for both parties, and that estoppel (because of some 
"agreement") should attach. The State does not agree. Even if 
the State had the authoritv,there are no specifics contained in the 
letter which substantiate plaintiff's claim. As minimal evidence 
of such a modification and waiver, the letter should have 
included: (1) That the decree was being changed to be what ~laintiff 
says; (2) That alimony was waived (which was not mentioned in the 
letter;; (3) That the arrearages were.specifically waived with the 
naming of those involve~ (4) The period of time the waiver was 
to cover (here onlv orospective payments to the State were mentioned). 
None of these matters was covered or mentioned in the letter. It 
is difficult to see how plaintiff can contend that the letter is 
so "clear" on these points. The court might possibly find that 
all the points alluded to are not necessary, or that they all 
be spelled out in such soecificity, but in the letter relied on 
-12-
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bv plaintiff (Ex.16) not only are none of them mentioned, they 
aren't even alluded to. 
Interpretation #3: This interpretation is that Plaint: 
was to pay $225 per month for September and bring current his 
payments of $450 per month by the end of October, including 
arrear ages. 
This position, as in interpretation two, is inoonsis~~ 
with the facts, but is still a possible interoretation. Since 
the State was interested in having Mr. Ross send -- at most-· 
$232 per month, requiring him to send the $450 by the end of 
October probably was out of the scope of Mr. Zambos unless Mr, 
Ross voluntarily did so. It is just as logical to say the 
letter means to catch all back payments up the end of October 
as to say all back is waived. 
Other interpretations: Any combination of the above and 
possibly other totally unrelated interpretations are poss~~. 
Clear is definitely one thing the letter "is not." 
The letter, its elf, is at best ambiguous and is the only 
neutral evidence. It should speak for itself. It does when rea 
in light of the evidence. The court, as trier of fact, had 
every opportunity to review it and come to the same conclusion 
as the State -- that irrespective of whether the State had aut' 
to compromise any and all claims of both parties in an unrestri 
manner, there is still no direct evidence that any compromise c 
arrearages or modification of the decree took place. There woui 
have to be something more soecific than "ambiguity." The ?laint 
position therefore fails for lack of evidence and supoort. 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SHOW WHERE ESTOPPEL 
AGAINST THE STATE IS AN APPROPRIATE DOCTRINE IN 
THIS MATTER,A..~D THEREFORE THE JUDGM.ENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Appellant relies heavily upon the equitable theories of 
estoppel and laches. He asserts the doctrines against carol 
Ross saying certain acts of hers should bar her recovering 
certain past due child support and alimony payments. It is 
unclear to what extent the appellant is making these claims 
against the State. If appellant is contending that laches and 
estoppel apply to both parties, it is important to point out 
that except for the letter already discussed, the URESA action, 
and a few other minor points, the acts used to point out the 
effectiveness of the doctrine were basically after Mrs. Ross 
was off of welfare and done by her, not the State. This should 
be kept in mind as this matter is discussed. 
The equitable doctrine of estoppel carries with it a high 
burden of evidence. In this particular case the plaintiff is 
trying to displace a legal riqht with a substitute doctrine_ that 
prohibits one from exercising this right. Courts must be cautious 
in so ruling. Such an imposition must not be allowed unless 
convincing evidence is produced to show that somehow the partv 
holding the legal right has acted in such a way as to essentially 
"waive" its effect. The evidence needed to substantiate 
plaintiff's claim does not exist in this case to sustain a ruling against 
the State of Utah. 
What legal right does the State of Utah have that plaintiffis 
trying to suppress? At the time of the accrual of the State's inter-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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est (1972-1973), Utah Code 1'.nnotated 78-45-9 read as follows, 
in part: 
Hhenever the state department of public welfare 
furnishes support to an obligee, it has the same right 
as the obligee to whom.the suoport was furnished, for~ 
purpose of securing _reimbursement and of obtaining -
continuing support. (Emphasis addedJ 
With the assignment, as previously discussed, there is no conte· 
tion that the State is not entitled to funds, but it is thisk 
right that the plaintiff must displace. 
The following test of estoppel has been adopted by this 
court in the case of J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Companv, Jr. 
534 P. 2d 903 (Utah, 1975): 
It is a doctrine of equity to prevent one 
party from deluding or inducing another into a 
position where he will unjustly suffer loss. 
As applicable here, the test is whether there 
is conduct, by act or omission, by which one 
party knowingly leads another party, reasonably 
acting thereon, to take some course of action, 
which will result in his detriment or damage 
if the first party is permitted to repudiate 
or deny his conduct or representation. 
Regarding the State's 1;)Qsi tion, there is no evidence that 
Mr. Ross was induced to a position of injury where he would 
"unjustly suffer loss." At the time Mr. Ross claims he madett 
"agreement" with Mr. z ambos regarding the past arrear ages owina 
the State, the full $1, 854 claimed by the State was already owe 
How can he now claim that the State should now be estopped fro: 
claiming what was already the case. He has not lost anything, 
but in fact has gained, because he has not paid the Stateand 
The 
could use the funds owing the State for other purposes. 
State cannot see where, as the above case states, where t~n 
is any "conduct, by act or omission, by which one party knowinr 
leads another party, reasonably acting thereon, to take some 
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course of action, which will result in his detriment or damage. " 
As noted _in plaintiff's brief, plaintiff moved to Utah, 
sold a boat, paid a couple hundred dollars for the move, but 
found a job where he earned approximately the same. Since 
plaintiff already owed the money, all the State can see that 
he can complain of is that he is now finally having to pay what 
he already owed. This is no more a detriment than what already 
existed at the time plaintiff contacted Mr. Zarnbos. 
However, the State realizes the complexity of the issues 
and that olaintiff contends the State's and Mrs. Ross' actions 
go together to prove the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel 
and laches and therefore discusses these matters in more detail. 
Inducement must be shown. Mr. Ross is claiming that Mr. Zarnbos 
induced him to pay $225 per month and, apparently, that Mrs. Ross 
acquiesced and induced him as well to continue those payments, 
believing the arrearages and differential were "forgiven". ·The 
evidence (plaintiff's attorney's letters, phone conversation 
as testified to by Mr. Zambos and Mr. Ross, and a letter) shows 
no direct inducement. Could it have been negligent inducem~nt 
where Mr. Zambos' coI1U11ents were taken out of context and relied on 
by Mr. Ross? If this is the case, the matter fails, because this 
court requires that the inducing party do so "knowingly·" 
Further, did Mr. Ross "reasonably rely" on the "inducement"? 
Is it reasonable for Mr. Ross to have relied on the letter and 
phone conversation? 
In speaking on what constitutes "reasonable reliance" this 
court in Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 513 P.2d 420 (Utah, 1973) said: 
The determination of such an issue is not 
dependent on the asserted subjective content of 
-lfi-
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the mind of the person claiming he was misled. 
The test to be applied is an objective one as to 
what a reasonable and orudent oerson in the cir-
cumstances might conclude; and-the burden of proof 
and of persuasion as to the issue of estopPel~is 
upon him who asserts it, 
The State believes Mr. Ross was in a "preconceived" 
state of mind and did not reasonably rely on or believe the Sk 
letter was a modification. Mr. Ross's mother, Mary McKendrick, 
testified that after Mr. Ross left California he sent between 
$200 and $225 per month (T.83, 85, 90), this, even though he 
knew the divorce order was $450. He further told Mrs. Ross he 
would never pay more than $225 per month (T. 67). His Texas att 
wrote him a letter saying that welfare was paying Mrs. Ross $2J. 
so he should send that much to Recovery Services (Ex.17). In 
essence, Mr. Ross had his mind made UJ? as to "how much" he was 
going to pay before, during and after he spoke to Mr. Zambos. 
Where is the "reasonable" reliance? If anything, it could ~ 
argued that Mr. Ross put words into Mr. Zambos' mouth, thoughv: 
Zarnbos testified he could not recall the conversation directly 
and that the file showed no relation except the letterdatedOct 
4, 1973 (T. 98-9, 114-115). If, as the court says in Coroorati 
Nine, id., the standard is an objective one, the plaintiff's ca 
fails. 
As to plaintiff's contention that estoppel by laches aopl' 
Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1968,defines est 
by laches as follows: 
A failure to do something which should be 
done or too claim or enforce a right at a proper 
time . . A neglect to do something one should 
do, or to seek to enforce a right at a proper 
time. 
-17-
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Since this court held in Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1975~ 
that for purpos~s of child support and alimonv the statute of limita-
tions is eight years, and further since the legislature has 
codified this position in u.c.A. 78-12-22, the State cannot 
accept the proposition that the State did not.act in time. Five 
and one-half years after the first welfare was given and four and 
one-half years after the last. 
In addition, according to U.C.A. 78-12-35 the absence from 
the State of one against whom an action accrues tolls the statute 
of limitations. However, in November 1973, the State of Utah 
made the attempt through a URESA action (Ex.20) to establish a 
support order for ongoing support, u.c.A. 77-6la-l et. seq. 
This itself asked for more than the $225 claimed by the plaintiff 
as onqoing support. The State had no control of the action in 
Texas, and the matter was dismissed for lack of prosecution there. 
Upon learning of the presence of the plaintiff in Utah because of 
this action the matter was revived - well within the eight year 
period and in c:onformitv with its right to do so. Plaintiff's 
argument of laches is therefore without merit. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY OF 
MR. ZAMBOS ON CROSS-EXAMINATION AS TO HIS PROCEDURE 
AS AN INVESTIGATOR. 
Plaintiff points out several statements made by Mr. Zambos 
on c~ examination which he claims are "legal error" by the 
court. Mr. Zambos was never called as a witness for the State, 
though his testimol¥ on direct and cross examination could have 
benefited or hindered the State, as the court would view it. 
Cross-examination is for the purpose of clarifying, expanding 
-18-
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and delvinqinto what was brought out in direct testimonv. It 
is this that plaintiff objects to. 
As to the contention that soecific errors wer · e corrun1 ttea, 
plaintiff con tends the Mr. Zarnbcs' testimony was "totally" irtE 
and immaterial as to what he did in his six years wi'th R ecover1· 
Services. Referring to modifying decrees by accepting less~ 
that ordered by the court, Mr. Zambos said in answer to a qu; 
on cross-examination: 
Q. And in that period of time have you ever made 
an agreement to accept less child SU?port than what was 
ordered in the divorce decree? 
A. No. (T.115) 
It is relevant and material to know whether Mr. Zambos 
had ever agreed to "modifications" when the State was entitled 
to the full amounts under the decree. Naturally, if he never! 
then he wouldn't have done it on this case. However, simply bee 
evidence is not "direct" evidence does not per se make it objec· 
tionable. The trier of fact is entitled to give little or no 
weight to this testimony since it was not specific enough in 
the eyes of the plaintiff. The fact that it was not stricken 
is not error. 
Plaintiff's second claim of error is that because Mr. Zt 
had said he had no independent recollection of the events deal: 
with the phone conversation, it was error for the State's atto: 
to speak of exhibit 16 as being the only thin? that could refr: 
his recollection of the events. (T.115) It is true that wheti 
there is no recollection it cannot be refreshed. However, Mr.: 
was not asked if his memory was refreshed, he was only ask~C 
letter which he wrote would be the only thing that would nf~ 
d 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum nd Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hl·s memory, and he answered, "Yes." Th St e ate sees no prejudice 
with that answer. If it "would" be the only thing that would 
refresh his memory and didn't, as Mr. Zambos testified, no harm 
or inappropriate testimony was permitted. If error there was, 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure would declare that 
harmless error is not critical. 
As to plaintiff's next objection, plaintiff is saying 
that a person who writes a letter cannot give testimony regarding 
it. Such a position strains reason. Mr. Zambos never testified 
he had no recollection of the letter. He did testify that he 
had no independent recollection of the phone conversation. (T .115) 
He testified that his recollection of the letter was that Mr. Ross 
was to pay $450 at the end of October. (T.116) Somehow plaintiff 
is confusing the letter and the phone conversation. They are 
independent actions. 
Since all evidence, whether direct, circumstantial, opinion, 
etc., is to be viewed by the trier of fact, then simply because 
the author of a letter testifies to what it meant must be viewed 
in light of what the letter itself says as well as what the narties 
say. Plaintiff's argument here is without merit. 
The next two claims of error relate to the same set of 
questions on T. 116-117. Once again it is pointed out that 
!1r. Zambos was under cross-examination by defendant's counsel. 
The trier of fact has broad discretion in determining what tvpes 
of "leading questions" if any, are allowable. 98 C.J.S. v7itnesses 
329. 
· · t t i· n h. is · Counsel for plaintiff appears to be inconsis en 
t 'f as to "general position in claiming that Mr. Zambos cannot tes i.y 
principle" or "practice" of himself or the office he represented. 
-20-
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Yet Mr. Sykes, plaintiff's counse~opened the whole vista 
himself on direct examination. On three specific occasions 
immediately preceeding cross examination, counsel for plaintifi 
asked !-tr. Zambos what was the "customary practice:' (T. 102, line: 
24-29; T.104, lines 2-3; T.104, lines 5-7) Further, counsel 
for plaintiff asked two specific questions where he wanted to 
know what thP. "customary procedure" was. (T .130, lines 20-21; 
T.103, lines 23-25) Counsel also asked Mr. Zambos once whethe 
something done was the "typical procedure~' (T.99, lines 1-2) 
In addition, counsel for plaintiff and the court had a discuss 
about what counsel was driving at with this "customary practice' 
(T.104, lines 15-25) and Mr. Sykes told the court (as it relate 
to the questions he was asking) "This is very important to my 
case." (T.104, Line 24) 
Counsel for the State of Utah finds it very difficult to 
understand how counsel for plaintiff opens up the testimony of 
"customary practice, procedure, etc. , " and objects to counsel'. 
the adverse parties to cross-examine Mr. Zambos on the direct 
examination that was so "very important to my case." Counsel 
sees no error in allowing Mr. Zambos to testifv to the same 
questions in cross-examination that were asked by counsel who 
is now objecting. 
When witnesses are called, direct is not the only 
testimony that is credible. Cross-examination is oft times 
just as revealing. But, the fact that cross-examination - us: 
the same questioning form as plaintiff - proves disadvantageou; 
to plaintiff's case is no reason for this court to allow t~ 
answers given by Mr. Zambos to Mr. Sykes' questions and dismis' 
-21-
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as "prejudicial" the answers given when the same type of questions 
were posed by Mr. Williams or Mr. Schwendiman. That is an incon-
sistent oosition and should be rejected. 
As to whether Mr. Zambos gave a "legal conclusion" in 
his answer at T.117, lines 8-9, is a matter o~ interoretation. 
If this court holds that it is not an established fact 
that only the court can modify a court order, or perhaps that it 
was not common knowledge of that fact, or if it was a legal 
question as to whether the court was the only one that could 
change a court order, then perhaps counsel would have a point. 
Mr. Zambos was testifying to his understanding. 
Even if his answer was error, which counsel for the State 
does not believe, where is this entire case orejudiced? This 
whole lawsuit is over the fact that the court order was not 
changed. Mr. Zambos testified as to his belief and how he acted. 
The trier of fact can discern whether or not his answer was.proper, 
and so ruled. Plaintiff's claim should be rejected. No prejudice 
has been shown, and counsel for the State believes there was 
none from this answer. 
Turning the cour~s attention to Plaintiff's last assertion 
that error was committed by the court in allowing Mr. Schwendiman 
to ask what understanding Mr. Zambos had in the compromise of 
cases, ))laintiff's counsel asserts there was no foundat.ion. 
Mr. Sykes, on re-direct examination opened the whole area of 
compromise (T.118-120): 
Q. Okay. 
claims or . . . 
So you are authorized to compromise 
(T.118) 
* * * * * 
Q. You -- you do have the authority to 
comorornise claims with the Bureau and director's 
approval, right? (T.119) 
* * * * * 
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Q. And in fact isn't that a common practice 
where a husband is behind on his child support 
or alimony payments? 
A. Common practice to do what? 
Q. To compromise a claim to get the guy to 
start paying in the futur~, compromise a past alimony 
or (T.119) (Emphasis added.) 
It was totally proper cross-examination for Mr. Schwendir 
to ask Mr. Zambos "What is your understanding of the proce~n 
as to what amounts you can compromise?" (T.120) Mr. Sykes 
elicited the facts that the State could compromise, etc.,yet 
now counsel is objecting to Mr. Zambos explaining in more detai. 
the q:uestions asked by Mr. Sykes. The foundation for the whole 
of questioning was laid by Mr. Sykes. Mr. Schwendiman did not 
need to "re-lay" the same foundation on "re-cross-examination." 
Therefore, the claims made by plaintiff seem to be claims 
to keep legitimate testimony out of the hearing of the court tr. 
he feels might weaken his case. Plaintiff called the witness, 
the questions objected to were aopropriate cross-examination 
questions, and the lower court ruled properly. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has a very high burden of establishing facts 
sufficient for this court to abandon legal rights by substituti 
its own parameters through an equitable doctrines. This burden 
has not been met. 
First, there is no clear or convincing evidence that a~ 
agreement was entered into by the State either dismissing 
arrearages or modifying the decree of divorce. The evidence i; 
· d t 1 ooti' ons for the lower ct ambiguous at most an presen s severa 
-2 3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney L w Library. Funding for digitization provid d by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to adopt. 
Second, the assignment given the State of Utah is not one 
of unbounded authority whereby the State of Utah can do what it 
oleases without concern for the assignor. 
Third, the court properly allowed testimony of Mr. Zambos 
to be admitted. No error was committed. 
The lower court, as the trier of fact,was in a position 
to properly see the issues and evidence and ruled properly in 
this matter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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